The CIA Vault: 9/11
How a deep state operation protected Al-Qaeda terrorists and the massive cover-up that followed.
In 2016, Donald Canestraro, a US Department of Defense investigator began looking into possible Saudi government and CIA involvement in the events leading up to 9/11. His unredacted letter sheds new light on the federal government’s actions.
Reports throughout the years drew suspicions that the Saudi government was connected to the 9/11 hijackers.
Long story short:
The CIA was working with the Saudis to infiltrate Al-Qaeda by recruiting two terrorists.
Both organizations protected these Al-Qaeda terrorists from the FBI.
These terrorists went on to become 9/11 hijackers.
Had the CIA not impeded the FBI, 9/11 likely would have been disrupted.
The CIA and the Saudis lied to the 9/11 Commission and the American people.
Senior FBI helped the CIA perform a 9/11 cover-up.
Omar al-Bayoumi was a suspected Saudi intelligence officer under FBI investigation post-9/11.
Al-Bayoumi associated with Fahad al-Thumairy, a Saudi diplomat. The FBI discovered that he was in contact with al-Thumairy while the latter was operating out of the Saudi Consulate in LA. He was also suspected of being a Saudi intelligence officer. Al-Thumairy was eventually deported from the US in 2003 for “suspected terrorist links”.
Al-Bayoumi associated with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. He helped them get an apartment in San Diego before the terrorist attack.
Credit: LP Mises Caucus
Canestraro interviewed a range of sources for his report.
CS-1, a former 9/11 Commission investigator, interviewed al-Thumairy while Saudi counter-intelligence was present. CS-1 wanted to know about his connections to al-Hazmi, al-Mihdhar, and possibly al-Bayoumi. They felt like al-Thumairy was hiding something. They interviewed al-Thumairy a second time, this time while the Saudi secret service was present. CS-1 noted his suspicious behavior in both interviews. For example, he reacted to al-Bayoumi’s name.
CS-2, a second former 9/11 Commission investigator, looked for a possible link between the Saudi government and the hijackers. Philip Zelikow, the staff director of the 9/11 Commission, limited how many witnesses investigators could interview.
CS-2 believed that al-Bayoumi was receiving a lot of money from the Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC before 9/11. The money was being funneled from the bank accounts of Haifa bin Faisal, the wife of the Saudi Ambassador to the US, Bandar bin Sultan. The investigation revealed that al-Bayoumi had a bunch of “no-show” jobs” while living in America. For example, he worked for Ercan, a Saudi subcontractor for Dallah Avco, a Saudi aviation company. Canestraro found that shortly after Al-Bayoumi’s meeting with the hijackers, his monthly pay from Ercan went up dramatically.
CS-2 was eventually fired by Philip Zelikow in 2003 for obtaining a “classified index” from a source “other than official channels”. CS-2 described this as a “minor security violation”. Zelikow seized it and didn’t let anyone else on the commission see it. CS-2 suspected Zelikow was trying to protect the Saudis. They also suspected al-Thumairy of being a Saudi intelligence officer.
At one point, the CIA had tracked the 2 hijackers to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, where a high-level meeting with Al-Qaeda was held. They had multiple entry visas to enter America. They traveled to America via Bangkok, Thailand.
CS-3 was a former FBI Special Agent assigned to UBL Station. Their colleague prepared a Central Intelligence Report (CIR) describing the possible presence of the hijackers in America. VVV, a CIA analyst, intervened and withheld the CIR from FBI headquarters to protect the CIA operation.
CIA officials at UBL Station, a place dedicated to all matters concerning Osama bin Laden, told CS-3 prior to their 9/11 Commission interview not to cooperate fully with Congress. A CIA officer was later present in the room during the interview. CS-3 did not speak up about the CIR to the CIA’s Inspector General out of legal fears.
Shortly after 9/11, CS-3 revealed the CIR’s existence to their supervisor. The supervisor immediately called a counter-terrorism official and later drove to FBI headquarters to meet with them in the Hoover Building’s parking lot.
Sometime after CS-3’s CIA IG interview, they were questioned by the FBI’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). CS-3 told the investigators about the CIR and how CIA officials had ordered them not to give it to the FBI. The CIA covered up the existence of the CIR because they didn’t want the FBI interfering in an illegal domestic CIA operation.
By the way, al-Bayoumi set up bank accounts and rented an apartment for the 2 hijackers at the behest of the CIA through the Saudi General Intelligence Directorate (GID). Prior to 9/11, the CIA was under pressure to recruit informants from within Al-Qaeda. VVV and their CIA colleagues were trying to recruit the 2 hijackers via a liaison relationship with the GID. The operation was being run by CIA analysts, not case officers. If the FBI had been warned, the FBI New York Field Office could have stopped the terrorists and changed 9/11’s outcome. The FBI was interested in Al-Qaeda for years before 9/11.
According to CS-3, the CIA approached the FBI’s counter-terrorism squad in New York in June of 2001 for a meeting regarding the two 9/11 hijackers. The CIA had lost track of them and needed the FBI’s help. Deputy UBL station chief, HHH, excluded CS-3 from attending the meeting. Had CS-3 attended, they would have spilled the beans about the 2 hijackers.
In a staff meeting with several high-level FBI and CIA officials, CS-3 said they overheard CIA Director of Operations James Pavitt telling CIA Director George Tenet that he was glad VVV had been kept away from the 9/11 Commission. Tenet acknowledged the statement and agreed. CS-3 believed that the conversation indicated that they had conspired to obstruct the 9/11 Commission by keeping VVV hidden.
CS-3 believed that the 2 hijackers got their visas at the American Consulate in Jeddah as part of the operation run by the GID and the CIA team back at UBL station. Also, al-Bayoumi was under FBI investigation before 9/11.
CS-5, a former FBI Special Agent, said CIA officials claimed they told FBI headquarters about the hijackers, but the 9/11 Commission showed that to be wrong. The CIA was running an operation targeting Al-Qaeda with the involvement of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. The operation may have spiraled out of control resulting in the CIA coming to the FBI for help. The CIA provided limited info to try to locate the hijackers without tipping off the FBI.
The 9/11 Commission didn’t do a thorough investigation of Bin Laden’s associates either. An FBI Analyst was prevented by the CIA from releasing critical info about the events leading up to 9/11. Had the FBI known, they could have stopped the hijackers and disrupted 9/11. An FBI Special Agent from the New York Field Office sent a message to the FBI Analyst stating that unless the analyst gave up that info, “someone is going to die.”That FBI Special Agent nearly “came over the table” at CIA officials during a counter-terrorism meeting before 9/11.
CS-7, an investigative journalist with law enforcement and intelligence community sources told Canestraro that Saudi national Osama Bassan was a GID informant associated with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. They also spoke of the Bin Laden family’s ties to international terrorism and the Saudi government.
CS-7 believed the Bush administration stalled the FBI’s investigation and spoke with Canestraro about the “Safari Club”. According to their sources, the CIA had maintained “a close, covert relationship with the Saudi General Intelligence Directorate (GID) for some years.” Where the CIA could not operate, the Safari Club would pick up the slack.
CS-8, a former FBI Special Agent confirmed the FBI’s surveillance of al-Bayoumi. They believed that he was affiliated with Saudi intelligence. CS-8 learned al-Bayoumi worked for Dallah Avco, a “cut out” corporation used for intelligence operations. They recalled that even though al-Bayoumi was arrested in the UK and police found his extremist literature, no charges were ever filed against him.
“Diplomatic pressure” was put on the FBI not to investigate the Saudi government’s connections to 9/11. FBI gained access to Haifa and Bindar’s bank accounts despite Riggs Bank denying access for a year. The hijackers’ presence in America and the Al-Qaeda meeting in Malaysia were not communicated to FBI San Diego prior to 9/11. A CIA intel officer was sent to FBI San Diego Field Office to fish for information to blame the FBI for failing to stop 9/11.
CS-9, a former FBI Agent assigned to the Washington Field Office. Agents were not allowed to interview Saudi nationals. Many of their leads “pointed toward the Saudi diplomats stationed in Washington, DC”.
Canestraro spoke with Richard Clarke, former Deputy National Security Advisor to President Clinton and President George W. Bush.
Deputy CIA Director Cofer Black told him that “the CIA did not have any human intelligence sources inside of Al-Qaeda” and “he was resolved to address this situation and penetrate Al-Qaeda with informants”. Clarke was never informed about the CIA's learning of that high-level Al-Qaeda meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. He later learned that roughly 50 people in the CIA knew about the two hijackers attending that meeting.
He never informed that the two hijackers had multiple entry visas and would have told FBI Special Agent John O’Neill over at the FBI New York City Field Office. He routinely passed along info from the CIA to the FBI.
Top FBI counter-terrorism division official Dale Watson was also not informed. FBI policy at the time would have led to the arrest of the hijackers. Clarke believed that the FBI was not informed because “the CIA was running a false-flag operation to recruit the hijackers.” Clarke publicly believed al-Bayoumi was relaying info about the 2 hijackers to the Saudis and the CIA. He received an angry call from former CIA Director George Tenet that did not deny the allegation.
The 9/11 Commission did not fully investigate the Saudi connection to 9/11. Phillip Zelikow was handpicked by National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice to protect Bush. Most records of the CIA operation involving al-Bayoumi were destroyed in a cover-up.
CS-4 was a former FBI Special Agent assigned to UBL Station in 2002 and responsible for supervising CS-3.
They approached CS-4 and revealed the existence of the CIR. CS-4 told CS-3 to tell no one else and contacted Pasqual D’Amuro, the FBI’s Deputy Director for Counterterrorism. They sped to FBI headquarters and met with D’Amuro. He read the CIR, said “I will take care of this.”, and ended the meeting. The CIR was never brought up again between CS-4 and D’Amuro. Shortly after, CS-4 was promoted to a senior liaison position outside of the FBI. They were concerned that this was done in order to keep them quiet.
CS-4 noted that UBL Station operated oddly. For example, CIA intelligence analysts rather than case officers were running it as all of the top positions at the station were occupied by analysts. Additionally, no communications could leave UBL Station without the approval of the analysts. CS-4 ordered FBI personnel assigned there not to take instructions from analysts. Over time, several CIA case officers expressed their frustration with the situation to CS-4. MMM, one of the most influential analysts at the station, had conflicts with FBI agents there. LLL, one of the chief analysts at the station, had conflicts with FBI Special Agent John O’Neil.
CS-10, a former CIA official who served for 25 years served as a case officer assigned to UBL Station.
The fact that the UBL Station was staffed mostly by intelligence analysts stood out as unusual as CIA intelligence analysts were not trained in intelligence-gathering operations. There was extensive CIA management pressure to develop human sources inside Al-Qaeda. Well, the UBL Station was physically located in America. The first chief of UBL Station was LLL, an analyst with no experience in operational matters. LLL shared most intelligence info on Al-Qaeda with MMM and VVV, two analysts. CS-10 observed strange activity at the UBL Station. For example, analysts were violating CIA procedures by directing case officers to complete tasks via cable. LLL first authorized this and later their replacement did too. Analysts were able to block one of CS-10’s operations against Al-Qaeda.
CIA analyst, MMM, ran operations at the station. Normally this is left up to a case officer. UBL Station’s analysts mostly stuck to themselves and didn’t socialize frequently. MMM, and their team of analysts had pseudonyms. This was odd because analysts didn’t work undercover nor were their jobs at the CIA classified to the public.
CS-12, a former FBI Special Agent in the New York Field Office in 2001, was assigned to the USS Cole bombing investigation.
They attended a meeting with the CIA regarding USS Cole. CIA analysts from UBL Station may have attended too. An FBI analyst from headquarters also attended. The analyst told CS-12 there were restrictions on photo sharing because of a “wall” put up between intelligence and investigations to stop agents from leaking classified information.
During the meeting, the FBI agents were shown three photos of suspected terrorists. The CIA wanted to know if any of the photos were of Fahd al-Quso. Another FBI agent began asking the CIA pointed questions, but they refused to provide any additional details. CS-12 argued with the FBI analyst on the need to put “stops” (border crossing e-alerts) on the individuals in the photos.
CS-12 kept pressing the FBI headquarters for more info on the photos’ subjects. Eventually, CS-12 found out that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were among the photos. In August of 2021, CS-12 had a heated conversation with the FBI analyst and was ordered by the analyst to delete the electronic message that tipped off CS-12 about the photos. Later that month, CS-12 had a 45-minute meeting with the analyst and the head of the UBL unit chief at FBI headquarters. FBI officials told CS-12 to stand down on their al-Mihdhar investigation as they were trying to open an intelligence-gathering investigation on the future hijacker. CS-12 told the analyst via email that “someone is going to die” if Mihdhar’s case wasn’t pursued.
After 9/11, CS-12 and other FBI agents had a heated second meeting with FBI headquarters. This is when they found out that the two hijackers’ names were listed on one of the 9/11 plane’s flight manifest. Additionally, one of the FBI Field Office’s analysts found out that the hijackers had addresses in San Diego.
Just a few days after 9/11, CS-12 contacted the FBI analyst and requested information on the attackers. The analyst provided a fourth photo, with a subject identified as Walid bin Attash. Had CS-12 and the other New York agents seen his photo, they would have linked bin Attash to the hijackers. This would have shifted the investigation over into a criminal one and may have resulted in the arrest of the hijackers before they could have carried out 9/11.
CS-12 testified before the 9/11 Commission that they had not seen bin Attash’s photo until after 9/11. After their testimony, Cofer Black told the Commission that CS-12 had shown the photo to an informant in Pakistan. This was not true. CS-12 revealed this to Barbara Grewe, a former FBI investigator, and 9/11 Commission official. They also advised her to interview Black about his false statements, but she informed them of the CIA’s own investigation. Further, she told CS-12 that the FBI and the 9/11 Commission were done investigating.
Former Senator Robert Graham of Florida, the co-chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee from June 2001 until January 2003, told Canestraro that neither the joint inquiry nor the 9/11 Commission did a deep dive into Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the attacks.
CS-14 was a former FBI agent who worked with a CIA case officer to interview CW1, an informant passed on to the FBI from another government agency.
The CIA officer was present because CS-14 could not speak CW1’s language. Unbeknownst to CS-14, their CIA counterpart was showing CW1 photos of the Al-Qaeda meeting in Malaysia. After 9/11, CS-14 learned that CW1 recognized Walid bin Attash in the same photos as Nawaf al-Hazmi.
CS-14 gave a statement to the 9/11 Commission about CW1’s debriefings and their CIA counterpart corroborated CS-14’s statement. The CIA officer told the investigators that CS-14 did not know about CW1’s ID of bin Attash. A CIA analyst at UBL station prevented the FBI from getting the full info on the meeting. Consequently, the FBI in NYC didn’t know the hijackers had visas to enter America.
After the 9/11 attacks, former FBI Director Mueller took 100% of the blame for the intelligence failures, but CS-14 disagreed with his assessment. Former CIA director George Tenet told the 9/11 Commission that CS-14 was told by the CIA before 9/11 that CW1 had ID’d bin Attash by photo. CS-14 was never given this info before 9/11.
Canestraro re-interviewed CS-14 in June of 2021.
The CIA officer who had helped CS-14 in handling CW1 spoke with CIA officials about giving CW1’s file to CS-14. CS-14’s access to CW1’s file was blocked by HHH, the CIA’s liaison officer at FBI headquarters and deputy station chief of UBL station.
CS-15 was a former FBI Special Agent who started in the ’80s, served on the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, and was appointed the chief of the FBI’s UBL unit.
The CIA shared photos of the Al-Qaeda meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia with the FBI but provided them little context. Had the CIA provided the FBI with more information, they could have disrupted 9/11. The former head of the CIA’s UBL unit prevented the FBI from seeing key 9/11 info.
CS-16 was a former senior FBI official.
Al-Mihdhar was the son-in-law of Ahmed al-Hada, an Al-Qaeda terrorist connected to the 1998 East Africa bombings. The FBI got al-Hada’s contact info during their East Africa bombing investigation. The info was given to a CIA case officer who passed it along to the National Security Agency, who then exploited it to get significant info on Al-Qaeda’s operations. The FBI in NYC wasn’t told about the hijackers until late August 2001. The CIA withheld the fact that the hijackers entered America in 2000 from the FBI on orders from CIA employees Richard Blee and Tom Wilshire. The info was withheld because the CIA was trying to recruit al-Hazmi and/or al-Mihdar as intel sources while they were in America.
CS-22 was a former FBI Special Agent with extensive terrorism and counter-intelligence experience.
After 9/11, it became impossible for the FBI to unilaterally investigate terrorism or counter-intelligence investigations without the CIA’s approval. CIA officers would frequently spy on FBI agents while they worked on counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence operations. After 9/11, a private individual investigated Abdussattar Shaikh, a former FBI informant, and discovered that he was also getting money from the Saudi government. The Saudi government was using him to spy on its citizens abroad. Canestraro discovered that Al-Hazmi and al-Midhar had rented a room from Shaikh in the Spring of 2000.
CS-23 was a former FBI Special Agent who specialized in counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence matters.
The FBI conducted a counter-intelligence investigation into al-Bayoumi before 9/11 because he was a suspected intelligence officer. The FBI reached out to CIA headquarters for info on al-Bayoumi, but the CIA lied and said they had nothing. Al-Bayoumi was a Saudi intelligence officer and Al-Thumairy told him to recruit the two hijackers. Witnesses were present at their Saudi Consulate meeting in LA. The CIA directed the attempt to recruit al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. The CIA used the Saudis as a go-between because the CIA was forbidden to operate on US soil.
The CIA never told the FBI in San Diego that the hijackers were in America. The FBI in San Diego and headquarters found out after 9/11, but senior FBI officials suppressed investigations into al-Bayoumi, the hijackers, and the Saudi-CIA joint operation. Testifying FBI agents were told not to reveal the full truth about Saudi involvement with Al-Qaeda to Congress.
Additional reporting
Final thoughts
I think it’s high time we abolish the CIA. This is unforgivable to me, and I’m not a New Yorker. In a just world, anyone that impeded those FBI investigations (including any senior FBI officials) would be held criminally responsible. How many people could have been saved on 9/11 if the federal government wasn’t doing stupid shit like this?
Thanks for reading.